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Abstract 
Adversarial examples reveal the vulnerability and unexplained nature of neural networks. 
Studying the defense of adversarial examples is of considerable practical importance. Most 
adversarial examples that misclassify networks are often undetectable by humans. In this paper, 
we propose a defense model to train the classifier into a human-perception classification model 
with shape preference. The proposed model comprising a texture transfer network (TTN) and an 
auxiliary defense generative adversarial networks (GAN) is called Human-perception Auxiliary 
Defense GAN (HAD-GAN). The TTN is used to extend the texture samples of a clean image and 
helps classifiers focus on its shape. GAN is utilized to form a training framework for the model 
and generate the necessary images. A series of experiments conducted on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST 
and CIFAR10 show that the proposed model outperforms the state-of-the-art defense methods for 
network robustness. The model also demonstrates a significant improvement on defense capability 
of adversarial examples.  
Keywords: Adversarial example, human-perception, defense model, Generative Adversarial 
Network, robustness 
 
1. Introduction 
Deep learning (DL) (LeCun et al., 2015) has demonstrated advancements in various tasks of 
artificial intelligence, including image recognition (He et al., 2016), natural language processing 
(Collobert & Weston, 2008), and speech processing (Hinton et al., 2016). These advancements are 
attributed to deep neural networks (DNNs), which can represent complex probability distribution 
over high dimensional data. Despite these advancements, DNNs remain imperfect. In particular, 
these networks show weaknesses considering adversarial examples when compared with humans 
(Akhtar & Weston, 2018). Adversarial examples can effectively fool a neural network to change 
its predictions, and the human eye cannot distinguish such examples from the original images. 
Moreover, adversarial examples can be transferred across different models (Akhtar & Mian, 2018). 
Improving the robustness of neural networks and finding effective defenses against these attacks 
are important, especially for security-critical applications.  
In recent years, many defense methods against adversarial examples have been proposed, and 
these methods can be divided into two categories. The first category is enhancement of the network 
robustness. Adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Araujo et al., 2019) and defensive 
distillation (Papernot et al., 2015) for classifiers are two typical and excellent methods. These 
defense methods often require attack patterns to be known a priori and are satisfactory against 
white-box attacks but poor for black-box attacks. The second category is a variety of data 
preprocessing methods. For example, PixelDefend (Song et al., 2018), high-level representation 
guided denoiser (HGD) (Liao et al., 2018), and ComDefend (Jia et al., 2019) are designed to 
combat against adversarial examples. Detection-based defense against adversarial examples from 
the steganalysis point of view (Liu et al., 2019) also shows excellent performance advantages. 
Implementing the latter category of the method is easier because retraining the neural network is 
no longer required. This type of preprocessing method mostly treats adversarial examples defense 
as a denoising process and does not fully explain the effect of adversarial examples on the network. 
Research on improving the robustness of the network itself is limited.  
Through the complete theoretical derivation and experimental verification, researchers from 
MIT first proposed that “adversarial examples are not bugs, they are features” (Ilyas et al., 2019). 
By extracting and analyzing the robustness and non-robustness of the image, they indicated that 
the neural network does not necessarily identify the image in the way of human decision-making 
but may instead capture some pixel information that does not affect humans. Then, they studied 
the dataset obtained by robust training and found that the features with robust training are more 
“human-aligned” (Engstrom et al., 2019). Their research indicated a new research direction for 
studying adversarial examples for the first time and provided a complete theoretical framework. 
The research results also further confirm our idea. However, the robust and non-robust features in 
their paper are mainly extracted by pre-trained models. Their experiments did not provide a 
concrete method that could use human perception to improve the model robustness effectively 
against adversarial examples.  
Simultaneously, the samples encountered in human learning are rich and diverse with 
interference and imagination. One of the most promising methods for unsupervised learning in 
complex distribution in recent years, generative adversarial networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al., 
2014), have the same effect as the human imagination. Originally introduced by Goodfellow et al. 
(2014), the GAN is a novel and successful generation model and deep learning framework. In this 
paper, the excellent image generation capability of GAN is used to improve the pre-training 
network structure, and an auxiliary defense GAN model close to human experience is designed. 
Inspired by human thinking and learning growth, this paper introduces the rich imagination of 
people and the human eye preference for shape into the design of the network structure and 
provides another “human” intelligence to the neural network. Specifically, the idea of designing a 
network has the following three aspects:  
⚫ When the human eye observes the target, the attention of the target shape is larger than the 
texture. By observing the confrontation sample, confusing the classification network but not 
deceiving the human eye is possible. The shape characteristics of the original target may 
maintain the macro shape.  
⚫ The existing data used to train the classification network are usually clear and clean (no noise). 
However, from the perspective of human learning, the information obtained is usually varied 
and ambiguous. The learning of such rich information also strengthens the capability of the 
human eye to resist noise.  
⚫ Human learning is not only based on existing limited samples but also from samples generated 
by human imagination. This process is similar to the training process of GAN. When designing 
the structure, we also attempt to control the loss function; thus, the training is generated in a 
specific direction. 
Our contributions are as follows. 
1. We propose HAD-GAN, a novel model that can introduce human shape perception preferences 
into adversarial examples defense by adding a texture transfer module. Our defense mechanism 
changes the training of the target classifier into a dynamic learning process similar to humans.  
2. For the first time, we associate GAN with human imagination. Our model links the last layer 
of the target classifier in parallel with a discrimination layer and completes the defense training 
only during the GAN training process. 
3. At present, many defense methods are conducted under conditions known in the attack method. 
The proposed model does not need to assume that the attack method is known a priori and is 
designed to improve the robustness of the network itself. 
4. Defense tests were performed on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR10 datasets at different 
target networks and attack methods. We also experimentally verified our defense model. 
Simultaneously, our model achieves better performance than that of the current defense 
methods (adversarial training, defensive distillation, Defense-GAN and BCGAN). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The necessary related work regarding existing 
attack and defense methods, GANs, and shape versus texture property studies of neural networks 
is presented in Section 2. Our defense model, which is called HAD-GAN, is formally motivated 
and introduced in Section 3. Then, the experimental settings and results are presented and 
comprehensively described in Section 4. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 5. 
2. Related work 
2.1 Existing attack and defense methods 
2.1.1 Attack methods 
Finding a good attack is a bi-criteria optimization problem, in which the attacker attempts to 
minimize the norm of the perturbation while trying to maximize the loss function. Various attack 
models and algorithms have been used to target classifiers. The present common attacks are mainly 
divided into white- and black-box attacks. In black-box attack, the attacker has no access to the 
parameters and training data set of the classification model. In the white-box attack, the attacker 
can obtain all the parameters of the classification model, such as network structure and permissions 
and details of the defense mechanism.  
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2015) Given an image x and its 
corresponding true label y, the FGSM attack sets the perturbation   to 
 = sign( ( , ))x J x y   . (1) 
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) was designed to be extremely fast rather than optimal. The 
method simply uses the gradient sign at every pixel to determine the direction in which to change 
the corresponding pixel value. 
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack (Sinha et al., 2018) PGD is an iterative attack 
method proposed by Madry et al. in 2017 and can be regarded as a multi-step variant of FGSM. 
The goal of the adversary is to solve the following type of problem: 
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In practice, the authors propose an iterative method to compute a solution: 
 1= ( sign( ( , )))
t t
x
x
x x J x y

+

 +  , (3) 
where x   is the Minkowski sum between {x} and { }
p
  ,   is the gradient step size, 
and S  is the projection operator on S. Madry et al. showed that (the l∞ version of) PGD is 
equivalent to the basic iterative method (BIM), which is another important iterative attack. As for 
fast gradient methods, PGD can be implemented either with p = ∞ or p = 2. In this study, we use 
PGD to represent a variety of iterative attacks. 
Carlini & Wagner (CW) attack (Carlini&Wagner et al., 2017) CW (2017) solves the 
following type of optimization problem to craft an l2-norm adversarial example: 
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where f is the objective function, which is defined to drive the example x to be misclassified. c 
represents a suitably chosen constant. CW attack is an l2 attack because the objective function aims 
to minimize the l2 norm of the perturbation. CW can also be implemented as an l∞ attack, but this 
attack is not as effective as classical l∞ attacks. 
2.1.2 Defense methods 
Various defense mechanisms have also been employed to combat the threat from adversarial 
attacks. As discussed in Section 1, defense mechanisms can be divided into two categories: 
enhancing the robustness of the network and data preprocessing. 
Enhancing the robustness of the network  Adversarial training is a popular approach to 
defend against adversarial attack by adding the adversarial examples generated using one or more 
chosen attack models to the training set (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Araujo et al., 2019). This 
situation often results in increased robustness when the attack model used to generate the 
augmented training set is the same as that used by the attacker. Given that the defense mechanism 
designed to protect against one type of attack often offers poor performance against the other, some 
improvement methods, such as randomized adversarial training (Araujo et al., 2019) have also 
been gradually proposed. These defense methods show that data quality and training process both 
affect model quality, and data enhancement can improve the model capability to defend attacks. 
Defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2015) is another typical method. Defensive distillation trains 
the classifier in two rounds using a variant of the distillation method. The approach reduces model 
sensitivity to input variations by decreasing the absolute value of the model’s Jacobian matrix and 
introduces difficulties for attackers in generating adversarial examples. However, this approach 
fails to adequately protect against black-box attacks transferred from other networks.  
Data preprocessing  The second category includes a variety of data preprocessing methods. 
PixelDefend (Song et al., 2018), which was proposed by Song et al., can convert an image with 
interference into a clear image before inputting it to the classifier. Some researchers have perceived 
perceptual disturbances similar to noise and designed high-level representation guided denoiser 
(HGD) to eliminate such noise (Liao et al., 2018). Xiaojun Jia et al. proposed ComDefend, an end-
to-end image compression model used to combat against adversarial examples (Jia et al., 2019). 
Simultaneously, detection-based defenses against adversarial examples from the steganalysis 
viewpoint (Liu et al., 2019) also show excellent performance advantages. In contrast to the first 
category, implementing this category is easier because retraining the neural network is no longer 
required. Although these methods have good performance, they mostly treat adversarial examples 
defense as a denoising process and may not fully explain the effect of adversarial examples on the 
network. Defending adversarial examples is difficult due to the complexity of building a 
theoretical model of adversarial example generation process. 
 
2.2 Generative adversarial networks  
Generative adversarial network (GANs) (Goodfellow et al., 2014), originally introduced by 
Goodfellow et al. (2014), is one of the most promising methods for unsupervised learning in 
complex distribution in recent years. GANs are a class of artificial intelligence algorithms 
implemented by a system of two neural networks contesting with each other in a zero-sum game 
framework. GANs have achieved impressive results in image generation (Denton et al., 2015), 
image editing (Zhu et al., 2016), and representation learning (Radford et al., 2016; Salimans et al., 
2016). The quality and diversity of results from GANs have continued to improve, from generating 
simple digits and faces to synthesizing natural scene images, generating 1k photorealistic portraits, 
and producing 1000 object classes. Some modified versions of GAN, such as Condition-GAN 
(Mirza&Osindero, 2014), WGAN (Arjovsky et al., 2017), Cycle-GAN (Zhu et al., 2017) and 
SAGAN (Zhang et al., 2018), also demonstrate performance advantages in many scenarios. The 
key to the success of GAN is the idea of an adversarial loss that forces the generated images to be 
indistinguishable from real photos. This loss is particularly powerful for image generation tasks 
because this is exactly the objective that most computer graphics aim to optimize. 
At present, GANs are also used in adversarial examples generation (Yu et al., 2018) and 
defense. For defense, Defense-GAN (Samangouei et al., 2018) trained a GAN as a denoiser to 
project samples onto the data manifold before classification. However, Athalye et al. (Athalye et 
al., 2018) found that these methods, including other input transformations, suffered from 
obfuscated gradient problem and can be circumvented by corresponding attacks. Boundary 
conditional GAN (Sun et al., 2019) is proposed to enhance the robustness of DNN against 
adversarial examples by generating boundary samples of a pretrained classifier. These methods all 
take advantage of GAN. The experiments in this paper are also compared with the two methods. 
 
2.3 “Texture-Shape” perception of CNN 
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are generally known to identify objects by learning 
increasingly complex shape representations. Some recent studies illustrate that image textures 
show an important role in CNN. Robert et al. (Geirhos et al., 2019) quantified two contradictory 
hypotheses by evaluating CNN and human observers using images with “texture-shape” conflicts. 
Their evaluation shows that the most important factor in the standard process of artificial 
intelligence for object recognition is not the shape but the texture. Then, the authors used the style 
transfer method to generate a new data set; thus, the shape of the object is the only remaining 
useful information. Research also suggests that CNN may tend to be more priority to identify 
images by shape if learning different textures of the same shape. 
Recent research by the MIT team indicates that many applications of machine learning require 
models that are “human-aligned”, that is, they make decisions based on human-meaningful 
information regarding the input (Ilyas et al., 2019). Then, they reconverted robust training as a tool 
for enforcing human priors on the features learned by CNNs. The resulting robust feature 
representations turn out to be significantly more aligned with human perception (Engstrom et al., 
2019).  
However, the present research on the difference between neural network and human perception 
remains at the level of network characteristics. At present, no research links the separate “texture-
shape” perception between networks and humans to the emergence of adversarial examples is 
available. The effects of this perception on the defense against adversarial examples have not been 
studied. 
 
3. HAD-GAN model 
We propose a new defense network architecture called human-perception auxiliary defense 
GAN (HAD-GAN). In this section, we will elaborate HAD-GAN and introduce the procedure of 
using our HAD-GAN to enhance the robustness of our pre-trained classifier against adversarial 
examples.  
3.1 Motivation 
Based on the above background and thinking, our model is mainly designed around the 
following three points: 
⚫ Providing robust artificial intelligence. The machine learning system is easily deceived 
by the change in input information. With the deployment of additional intelligence-based 
systems, solving the confrontation problem is of practical significance. Focusing on 
defense against adversarial examples, we design new defense models that aim to improve 
the robustness of the classification neural network. 
⚫ Making the network learning process more like that of humans. The samples 
encountered in human learning, including those with various disturbances, are diverse and 
ambiguous and are even combined with imagination. Some studies have found that 
network classification preferences can be adjusted through control input. Therefore, our 
defense model is designed based on human thinking and discriminant laws. By focusing 
on human perception, the model attempts to simulate the learning process of people. 
⚫ Taking full advantage of GAN. GAN is a new and successful deep model of generating 
models. Notably, GAN is similar to human beings in generating images through 
imagination. Therefore, when considering human perception preferences, we use the 
excellent image generation capabilities of GAN to design an auxiliary defense GAN model 
that is more in line with human experience.  
3.2 Network architecture 
As described in the picture, our network structure mainly comprises three sub-networks, 
including two mappings (G: Generator, TTN: Texture Transfer Network) and the Discriminator 
(D, contains the target Classifier C). The input to our network is the clean image in the dataset. 
Every generated sample has a corresponding class label c in addition to the noise z. G uses both to 
generate images: ( , ) fakec z X→ . TTN uses the input image x and the texture dataset to generate 
real images for D: 1 2 0 1 2( , , , , ) ( , , , , )N N realx t t t s s s s X→ → . Then the output images of the two 
mappings Xfake and Xreal are entered into a CNN containing the target classifier C: 
1 2( , )nX c c c→ ，， . 
Notably, we linked a fully connected discriminant network in parallel at the penultimate level 
of the target classifier. Thus, the target classifier and the discriminant layer together form an 
adversarial discriminator D in GAN, in which D aims to provide a probability distribution over 
sources and class labels. The training mechanism is also inspired by the ACGAN (Odena et al., 
2017). In this framework, we only need to modify some parameters based on the image 
characteristics, and then defense training for almost any classifier can be achieved. 
 
Figure 1. Model structure of HAD-GAN 
 
3.3 Formulation 
In this section, we present a set of definitions and main loss functions to help formally describe 
our framework, theoretical model and algorithm. We develop our framework with these loss 
functions to enable our network to learn weight parameters of G and D given training samples {xi}. 
The Classifier becomes robust through the training on extending texture images. This section is 
mainly used to formulate each module and elements to facilitate the establishment of the latter 
model. The input to our model is the real image Xreal and its label {c} in the database.  
3.3.1 Texture Transfer model 
Our TTN uses an original image x and a series of selected texture images as inputs and 
synthesizes output images corresponding to the textures that recombine the shape of the former 
and imitates the texture of the latter. 
From the input batch RN C H Wx    , we strip every single x of its original texture and replace 
it with the style texture of a randomly selected painting by adaptive instance normalization (AdaIN) 
style transfer (Huang& Belongie, 2017) with a texture coefficient of α. We obtain the style images 
from Kaggle’s Painter by Numbers dataset due to its large style variety and size. 
AdaIN is a simple extension to instance normalization (IN), which we call adaptive instance 
normalization. AdaIN receives a content input x and a style input y and simply aligns the channel 
wise mean and variance of x to match those of y. Unlike batch normalization, IN, or conditional 
instance normalization, AdaIN has no learnable affine parameters. Instead, AdaIN adaptively 
computes the affine parameters from the style input as follows: 
 
( )
AdaIN( , ) ( ) ( )
( )
x x
x y y y
x

 

 −
= +
 
, (5) 
in which we simply scale the normalized content input with σ(y) and shift it with µ(y). Similar to 
IN, these statistics are computed across spatial locations. σ(x) and µ(x) are computed across spatial 
dimensions independently for each channel and each sample. Figure 2 shows an overview of our 
Texture Transfer Network based on the proposed AdaIN layer.  
 Figure 2. Model structure of TTN 
TTN uses the first few layers of a fixed VGG-19 network to encode the content and style 
images. An AdaIN layer is used to perform style transfer in the feature space. A decoder is learned 
to invert the AdaIN output to the image spaces. 
 ( , ) ( )T x s g t= . (6) 
Feature maps 
                             AdaIN( ( ), ( ))t f x f s= , (7) 
decoder g is trained to map t back to the image space. Generating the T(x, s), 
 ( ) ( )( )( , , ) 1 ( ) AdaIN ( ), ( )T x s g f x f x f s  = − + , (8) 
 ( ) ( )( )( , , ) 1 ( ) AdaIN ( ), ( )ij i j i i jT T x s g f x f x f s  = = − + . (9) 
Instead of the commonly used feature responses of the content image, we use the AdaIN output 
t as the content target. α is texture weight parameter, which is a weight that controls the degree of 
texture. Given that AdaIN layer only transfers the mean and standard deviation of the style features, 
style loss only matches these statistics.  
3.3.2 Adversarial Loss 
We apply adversarial losses to mapping function G and its discriminator D. Given that they 
form the GAN structure, we can refer to the loss function of GAN. 
 ~ ~ ( )min max ( , ) [log ( )] [log(1 ( ( )))]data zx p z p zG D
V D G E D x E D G z= + − . (10) 
We facilitate the adversarial losses of ACGAN to improve our adversarial loss and train the 
target classification network in D simultaneously. The function becomes the following form with 
the class labels in addition to the model. 
 fake ( , )X G c z= , ( ) { ( | ), ( | )}D x P S x P C x= , (11) 
 ~ ~ ( ), ~ ( )min max ( , ) [log ( )] [log(1 ( ( , )))]data zx p z p z c p cG D
V D G E D x E D G c z= + − . (12) 
The objective function is converted into the following two parts: the log-likelihood of the 
correct source, Ls, and the log-likelihood of the correct class, Lc. 
 [log ( | )] [log ( | )]S real fakeL E P S real X E P S fake X= = + = , (13) 
 [log ( | )] [log ( | )]C real fakeL E P C c X E P C c X= = + = . (14) 
Then, D and G are trained to maximize S CL L+  and C SL L− , respectively. As the ACGAN 
learns a representation for noise z that is independent of the class label (Odena et al., 2017), the 
original generator G loss and discriminator D loss is as follows: 
 C SL L L= −G , (15) 
 S CL L L= +D . (16) 
Intuitively, the predictive distribution by the classifier for the samples near the decision 
boundary is close to a uniform distribution due to the ambiguity of the class to which the boundary 
samples belong. Therefore, generating samples close to the boundary has been proven to be a 
possible way to improve the robustness of the classification model (Sun et al., 2019). An additional 
factor known as confidence loss (CL) (Lee et al., 2017) is leveraged in our model loss to improve 
the performance. 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( | )CL P xL KL U y P y x  =   , (17) 
where   are parameters of the original classifier, which are fixed during the training of the model. 
U is the uniform distribution and 0   is a penalty parameter. KL stands for KL divergence. 
Then the full generator G loss is 
 ( )CL C S CLL L L L= − +G . (18) 
Finally, our full objective can be written as 
 ( )GAN, =arg min max ( , ), ( , ) | ( , )L c z d T x s
G D
G D G D C . (19) 
3.3.3 Algorithm Flow 
 
Algorithm 1 HAD-GAN.  
Input: dataset D, training epochs K, batch size m, texture number T, texture coefficient  , 
noise coefficient n  
for k = 1 to K do 
  for random batch 
1{ , }
m
i i iy =x ~D do 
add noise (the mean of the gaussian noise is 0 and the variance of the gaussian noise is z): 
 = +i ix x n , i = 1, ⋯ , m 
for j = 1 to T do 
  ( ) ( )( )( , , ) 1 ( ) AdaIN ( ), ( )i j i i jT x s f x f x f s     − +decoder     
end for 
get the discriminator: { , }dD C  
generative adversarial training (updating model parameters of G & D): 
  ( )GAN, , arg min max ( , ), ( , ) | ( , )L c z d T x s   G D C
G D
G D C  
Output: model parameter C  
 
3.4 Defense Mechanism 
The designed defense network does not assume a known attack method but simply leverages 
the generative power of GAN. The robust classification network can be trained on either a pre-
trained classification network or a complete training of the untrained classifier. The texture transfer 
network in our defense model is built on a pre-trained network to ensure defense efficiency. After 
this processing, the main adjustment parameters in TTN are input noise power and texture weight, 
which effectively improve the training efficiency of the entire defense network. Notably, selecting 
the appropriate texture database based on different classification problems can achieve excellent 
experimental results. 
We describe our defense mechanism as follows, and the corresponding flow chart of the 
process is shown in Figure 3. 
1. The target classifier is added to our defense models based on the network architecture. The 
well-trained TTN and the texture dataset are obtained. 
2. Appropriate noise and texture weight are set. The noise in our model is set to Gaussian noise. 
3. HAD-GAN is trained with the losses in Eq. (19) to stabilize the generation result of GAN 
network generator and the classification accuracy rate of auxiliary classifier. 
4. Finally, the defensive-trained target classifier is taken out to calculate the robustness of the 
classifier against various adversarial examples. 
The core advantage of our method is that our network is trained on clean images rather than 
adversarial examples. Thus, we do not need to use attacking methods to generate adversarial 
examples, and our model is much smaller than many defense methods based on adversarial training. 
Furthermore, our proposed method is both attack-agnostic and model-agnostic and can be 
combined with other defensive methods. 
 
Figure 3. Defense mechanism 
 
4. Experiments 
We quantitatively evaluate the network robustness on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR10 
and compare it with other defensive methods to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
HAD-GAN. The experiment aims to prove that combining human discriminating preferences will 
improve the robustness of the network defense against the sample and explain the similarities and 
differences between the neural network and the human eye discriminating mechanism. Our method 
also successfully improves the accuracy of classification under attack conditions. 
4.1 Experimental settings 
We evaluated our approach on three publicly available datasets namely: MNIST (LeCun, Y., 
1998), Fashion-MNIST (Xiao, H., 2017) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky, A., 2010). The MNIST 
datasetconsists of 60,000 training and 10,000 testing gray-scale images of size 28x28 distributed 
evenly into 10 different classes. The classification goal is to determine the digit written. Fashion 
MNIST was designed to be a much more difficult and drop-in replacement for the MNIST dataset. 
The dataset CIFAR10 is a dataset that is broadly used for image classification tasks. It consists of 
60,000 examples, where 50,000 are used for training and 10,000 for testing, and each sample is a 
32 × 32 color image associated with 1 of 10 classes.  
We selected the target classifier based on the dataset complexity. LeNet5 is assumed to be the 
target Classifier that our model attempts to defend for MNIST. The architectures of the individual 
CNNs are described in Appendix B.1. The classification achieves a 99.5% correct classification 
rate on original MNIST testing datasets, which is comparable to state-of-the-art CNN accuracy. 
Considering both fair comparison and classification accuracy, we use ResNet50 similar to BCGAN 
and PixelDefend for Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR10. The architectures of the individual CNNs are 
described in Appendix B.2. The classification achieves 93.5% and 92.8% correct classification 
rates on original Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR10 testing datasets, which are comparable to state-
of-the-art CNN accuracy. As a model based on GAN, the generator is also crucial. We choose a 
basic generation network with four convolutional block layers for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. 
The U-Net model is directly leveraged for CIFAR10. We use machines equipped with NVIDIA 
GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPUs to train our model. 
It’s obvious that succeeding in an untargeted attack is easy, results in small perturbations, and 
transfers well to different models. Thus, we use untargeted adversarial examples to determine the 
performance of our model. The evaluations cover the state-of-the-art attacking algorithms 
including FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015), PGD (Sinha et al., 2018), CW (Carlini&Wagner et al., 
2017) and DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). We conduct FGSM and PGD with different 
magnitude  and PGD attack for 40 iterations with the gradient step size =0.01  on MNIST 
and Fashion-MNIST, with eight iterations on CIFAR10. We conduct an l2-norm attack with 2000 
test samples. For defense methods used for comparison, we have tested adversarial training 
(Goodfellow et al., 2015), defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016c), defensive BCGAN (Sun 
et al., 2019), and PixelDefend (Song et al., 2018). Adversarial training (with both FGSM and PGD 
examples) works by generating adversarial examples on-the-fly during training and including them 
into the training set. In contrast to adversarial training, defensive distillation and BCGAN are 
agnostic to the attack method. PixelDefend is both attack-agnostic and model-agnostic. The 
accuracy of the original and defense-trained classifiers by HAD-GAN is computed to show the 
effectiveness.  
4.2 Selection of hyperparameters 
We initially construct our model by transferring the main focus of the neural network from the 
target texture to the shape in natural images. Therefore, our model cannot achieve excellent 
performance on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST at the beginning because images in monochrome 
cannot effectively perform texture conversion. We add Gaussian noise on input images to solve 
the problem, making texture generation easy. Furthermore, we find that images with small sizes 
cannot provide sufficient pixels to construct efficient textures. Thus, we adjusted the structure of 
the TTN model by adding two Resize modules. The small images are first enlarged to fit the texture 
image and then restored at the output end. For CIFAR10, additional noise is no longer necessary 
because the real image itself already easily implemented texture transformation. The adjusted TTN 
structure shown in Figure 4 demonstrates evident experimental results on MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST and CIFAR10. The enlarged detail texture images are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 4. Improved TTN model structure 
The above analysis indicates that the HAD-GAN must have improved performance on large 
nature images such as ImageNet. However, an advanced generator model of GAN is needed to 
generate realistic natural images. This goal may be beyond the scope of this study, and the relevant 
results of datasets, such as ImageNet, will be presented in future research.  
Furthermore, the texture libraries corresponding to different types of datasets are different. For 
example, the images in MNIST and Fashion-MNIST are monochrome and the shapes are shown 
by white parts. We empirically found that the two can share a grayscale texture library. A separate 
color texture library is required for CIFAR-10, a. Experiments show that after proper selection of 
the texture library, adjusting the texture weight of TTN can make D achieve improved results. 
Overall, two hyperparameters in the neural networks must be determined before experiments. The 
first is the standard normal distribution Gaussian noise parameter n, and the second is the texture 
weight parameter α. The value of n and α depends on the performance of image auxiliary 
classification to improve the performance of the proposed method. Specifically, image 
compression discards part of the image information while retaining the main structural information 
of the image. The two hyperparameters are highly important in improving the model effect. 
Therefore, we first adjust the two parameters. For additional details, the main bases are as follows: 
1. The infinite norm between the texture and the original image is calculated, that is 0 ix t −  . 
2. Compared with the standard training classifier, the classifier trained by the HAD-GAN model 
has a classification accuracy on clean samples of no less than 95%. 
3. The changes in LG and LD are observed, and the training process of HAD-GAN tends to 
converge. 
The parameter adjustment basis is complicated, but the experiment proves that satisfying any 
two of the three points can achieve ideal experimental results. In subsequent experiments, the 
corresponding parameter values for each dataset are shown in the following table:  
Dataset parameter Value 
MNIST 
n 0.01 
  0.3 
 0~0.3 
Fashion-MNIST 
n 0.01 
  0.2 
 0~0.25 
CIFAR10 
n 0 
  0.05 
 0~0.06 
Table 1. The value of noise, texture weight and perturbation magnitude in the experiment. 
 is the perturbation magnitude of the attack method for each dataset. Notably, for attack 
methods, such as FGSM, perturbation magnitude is set up to 0.3, as opposed to 0.4 or more because 
noises are evidently perceptible to human eyes when the attack is too strong (when 0.4 ). In 
general as the strength of the attack increases the performance of defense algorithms tends to 
decrease, but the adversarial examples with excessive perturbation magnitude can even hard to be 
classified for human beings, so it is not involved in the setting of experiment parameters.  
Some enlarged textured images generated by TTN on the three datasets are shown in Figure 5. 
Additional textured images and images generated by G are shown in the Appendices A.   
 
(a) textured images for MNIST 
 
(b) textured images for Fashion-MNIST 
 
(c) textured images for CIFAR10 
Figure 5. Enlarged textured images generated by TTN 
 
4.3 Result 
4.3.1 Comparisons with other defensive methods 
We carried out a comprehensive set of experiments to test various defenses versus attacks. We 
compare the proposed approach with other existing schemes under the same attack distance metric 
to measure the performance of our approach quantitatively. The evaluations cover the comparison 
algorithms on MNIST, Fashion MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, as shown in Table 2-4. The results 
show that our approach in general outperforms other defending algorithms listed in the tables. For 
example, our approach outperforms existing methods and achieves an accuracy of 92.2%, 85.8% 
and 78.9% against the strongest attack in FGSM attack on MNIST, Fashion MNIST and CIFAR10 
datasets respectively whereas, BCGAN achieves 87.8%, 81.5% and 72.9% respectively, 
PixelDefend achieves 85.5%, 82.6% and 67.2% respectively.  
From the table we observe that adversarial training successfully defends against the basic 
FGSM attack, but cannot defend against the more advanced ones. Adversarial training with PGD 
examples is more successful at preventing a wider spectrum of attacks. Our approach also gets 
good performance on CW and DeepFool attacks. It achieves 89.3% and 89.7% accuracy on CW 
and DeepFool with =0.2  for MNIST; 88.3% and 88.7% accuracy with =0.1  for Fashion-
MNIST; 80.3% and 80.6% accuracy with =0.04  for CIFAR10. The proposed method also 
achieves highly defensive accuracy against FGSM, PGD, and CW, and competitive accuracy 
compared with other defense methods, such as adversarial training and BCGAN. These 
improvements demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Compared with the classifier 
trained on normal methods, the clean images classification accuracy of the classifier trained on our 
model does not considerably decline. This result also shows that our model does not affect the 
normal classification of clean images by the classifier. 
 
Defense Clean 
FGSM Adv. PGD Adv. CW DeepFool 
𝜖 = 0.1 𝜖 = 0.2 𝜖 = 0.3 𝜖 = 0.1 𝜖 = 0.2 𝜖 = 0.3 𝜖 = 0.2 
No Defense 99.5 31.2 22.3 16.5 13.4 10.5 6.0 24.2 31.5 
FGSM Adv.Tr 99.4 91.2 88.9 84.5 80.4 53.3 44.6 65.3 66.9 
PGD Adv.Tr 99.5 91.5 87.6 84.4 90.9 89.6 83.3 79.2 77.1 
Distillation 98.8 93.7 93.5 89.5 92.5 91.6 87.0 3.5 5.2 
BCGAN 97.7 89.4 89.3 86.8 89.7 88.1 85.7 87.5 88.3 
PixelDefend 97.4 96.6 92.2 85.5 95.5 91.4 84.1 88.9 89.4 
Our Approach 97.5 96.1 95.0 91.6 94.0 92.5 89.2 89.3 89.7 
Table 2. Performance comparison of HAD-GAN and other defense algorithms on the MNIST 
testing dataset. The highest accuracy is indicated in bold. 
Defense Clean 
FGSM Adv. PGD Adv. CW DeepFool 
𝜖 = 0.05 𝜖 = 0.1 𝜖 = 0.2 𝜖 = 0.05 𝜖 = 0.1 𝜖 = 0.2 𝜖 = 0.1 
No Defense 93.5 28.5 14.2 4.7 9.8 3.2 0.1 2.9 2.3 
FGSM Adv.Tr 93.1 81.6 78.4 75.1 37.5 12.7 3.4 15.7 11.9 
PGD Adv.Tr 92.8 76.7 66.9 55.8 79.5 75.3 71.4 53.6 54.1 
Distillation 92.3 83.5 81.3 80.4 81.0 80.4 78.1 0.0 0.0 
BCGAN 92.1 84.1 83.7 81.0 83.1 82.3 80.5 79.2 80.7 
PixelDefend 92.3 90.2 88.3 82.6 90.2 87.5 79.4 87.0 87.0 
Our Approach 92.1 91.0 89.6 85.8 89.4 87.0 83.7 88.3 88.7 
Table 3. Performance comparison of HAD-GAN and other defense algorithms on the Fashion-
MNIST testing dataset. The highest accuracy is indicated in bold. 
Defense Clean 
FGSM Adv. PGD Adv. CW DeepFool 
𝜖 = 0.02 𝜖 = 0.04 𝜖 = 0.06 𝜖 = 0.02 𝜖 = 0.04 𝜖 = 0.06 𝜖 = 0.04 
No Defense 92.8 25.5 14.4 10.1 12.0 5.2 1.0 0.2 0.5 
FGSM Adv.Tr 91.2 81.3 79.4 75.9 19.4 9.5 1.3 6.8 9.4 
PGD Adv.Tr 91.4 68.5 59.2 41.3 76.7 72.2 67.8 40.7 46.9 
Distillation 91.5 74.4 73.1 70.5 72.5 70.6 66.4 0.0 0.0 
BCGAN 90.0 77.3 74.1 72.0 74.3 72.2 70.3 73.6 74.3 
PixelDefend 90.8 82.9 76.0 67.2 80.2 72.1 63.2 80.0 81.0 
Our Approach 90.6 82.2 80.6 78.9 79.3 76.5 72.8 80.3 80.6 
Table 4. Performance comparison of HAD-GAN and other defense algorithms on the CIFAR10 
testing dataset. The highest accuracy is indicated in bold. 
4.3.1 Defensive performance testing 
As previously mentioned, our model is mainly divided into the following three sub-networks: 
TTN, G, and D. We consider designing a comparison experiment, which compares the defensive 
performance of a module with and without it to verify the defense effect and analyze the 
performance of our model. For example, a round of experiments is performed without TTN, and 
then a set of comparative experiments is performed after the addition of TTN. The comparative 
tests of TTN are designed to verify our idea that adding human shape perception can enhance 
neural network defense performance against adversarial examples. Similarly, we investigate the 
effect of our defense model by computing the average accuracy of the partly- and fully-trained 
classifiers with our model which are tested on adversarial examples produced by different attack 
magnitude  of FGSM and PGD. 
Figure 6-8 respectively shows the experiment results on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and 
CIFAR10. The solid lines (ND: No Defense) show the accuracy of image classification models 
tested on the adversarial images with no defense. ND is used as a reference for defensive 
performance testing. CL is a Loss function added to the GAN to observe the performance 
improvement after enhancing the loss function. Red lines marked with diamonds (HADGAN-CL) 
indicate the test results without CL. Blue lines marked with asterisks (HADGAN-TTN) indicate 
the test results without TTN. Orange lines marked with triangles (HADGAN-CL-TTN) indicate 
the test results without both CL and TTN. The robustness of the model is significantly improved 
only after TTN addition (corresponding to human discrimination preference) to the training model. 
However, similar to the human eyes, the accuracy rate still decreases in the case of excessive attack 
perturbation, which also reflects the correlation between network design and human characteristics. 
We combine CL during the training process of GAN and continue the experiment to slow down 
the rate of accuracy decline. As shown by the red line marked with solid dots, optimizing the 
network parameters such as the loss function will also have a certain effect on the improvement of 
the defensive performance. This part of the experiment also shows that combining the advantages 
of the human eye and the network will be a feasible way to generate “1 + 1 > 2” and improve 
network performance. 
In Figure 6-8, we additionally show the comparison results of the existing methods. 
PixelDefend slightly outperforms our approach in defending only when the disturbance amplitude 
is small. Although there is a drop in performance of our approach as the strength of the attack 
increases it does not significantly drop as compared to PixelDefend. 
 
    
  (a)                                          (b) 
Figure 6. Average accuracy of our defense-trained classifiers and existing methods tested on 
MNIST dataset in FGSM and PGD attacks. (Baseline: original accuracy, ND: No Defense, 
HADGAN-CL: our model without CL, HADGAN-TTN: our model without TTN, HADGAN-CL-
TTN: our model without CL and TTN) 
 
   
  (a)                                          (b) 
Figure 7. Average accuracy of our defense-trained classifiers and existing methods tested on 
Fashion-MNIST dataset in FGSM and PGD attacks. 
     
  (a)                                          (b) 
Figure 8. Average accuracy of our defense-trained classifiers and existing methods tested on 
CIFAR10 dataset in FGSM and PGD attacks. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a novel defense model to defend adversarial examples. HAD-GAN 
can be trained on clean images without known attack methods. For the first time, HAD-GAN 
combined the shape-texture discrimination preferences of humans and neural networks in the 
defense against adversarial examples. Experimental results illustrate the effectiveness of our model. 
More importantly, our work demonstrates that adding human features to the network can improve 
the robustness of the network against attacks. 
Researchers must always make a choice. Should the model make an “accurate” decision, or a 
“human” decision? The research in this paper further demonstrates that if we want to obtain a 
method that is meaningful to humans and faithful to the model, we must provide necessary 
interventions during the training process. At present, image recognition technology has been 
widely used in daily life, and we need to find a certain balance between the two choices. 
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Appendices  
A. Examples of textured images and generated images 
    
(a)                                          (b) 
 
  
(c)                                          (d) 
    
(e)                                             (f) 
Figure 7: Examples of textured images generated by TTN on the three datasets and images 
generated by G. (a) Textured images for MNIST. Four consecutive pictures are a group; the first 
one is the original image, and the last three are the output images corresponding to different texture 
data. (b) Generated images for MNIST. Each column corresponds to a category. (c) Textured 
images for Fashion-MNIST. Three consecutive pictures are a group; the first one is the original 
image, and the last two are the output images corresponding to different texture data. (d) Generated 
images for Fashion-MNIST. Each column corresponds to a category. (e) Textured images for 
CIFAR10. Four consecutive pictures are a group; the first one is the original image, and the last 
three are the output images corresponding to different texture data.  
Two interesting phenomena are worth pointing out. First, as shown in picture (c), 
distinguishing some original figures into categories by humans is difficult; for example, in the 
third set of pictures, the original picture can only see a collar-like area. However, after processing 
by the TTN network, pixels that are invisible to the human eye on the original image are displayed. 
After comparison, the texture image categories of these outputs are correct. Second, the generated 
images are randomly divided into two types: clear and blurred background. This division indicates 
that the networks trained by our model not only process clear images but also process and classify 
blurred images with noise interference.  
 
B. Classifier architectures 
B.1. Target classifier for MNIST 
NAME CONFIGURATION 
Feature Block 1 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 16, stride size: 1 × 1) 
batch normalization & leaky relu & dropout 
Feature Block 2 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 32, stride size: 1 × 1) 
batch normalization & leaky relu & dropout 
Feature Block 3 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 64, stride size: 1 × 1) 
batch normalization & leaky relu & dropout 
Feature Block 4 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 128, stride size: 1 × 1) 
batch normalization & leaky relu & dropout 
Pooling Layer average pooling (stride size: 2 × 2) & flatten 
Output Layer fc_10 & softmax fc & sigmoid 
 
 
B.2. Target classifier for Fashion MNIST & CIFAR-10 
NAME CONFIGURATION 
Initial Layer conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 16 (4), stride size: 1 × 1) 
Residual Block 1 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 16, stride size: 1 × 1) 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 16, stride size: 1 × 1) 
residual addition 
×8 times 
Residual Block 2 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 32, stride size: 2 × 2) 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 32, stride size: 1 × 1) 
average pooling & padding & residual addition 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 32, stride size: 1 × 1) 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 32, stride size: 1 × 1) 
residual addition 
×7 times 
Residual Block 3 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 64, stride size: 2 × 2) 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 64, stride size: 1 × 1) 
average pooling & padding & residual addition 
 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 64, stride size: 1 × 1) 
batch normalization & leaky relu 
conv (filter size: 3 × 3, feature maps: 64, stride size: 1 × 1) 
residual addition 
×7 times 
Pooling Layer batch normalization & leaky relu & average pooling 
Output Layer fc_10 & softmax fc & sigmoid 
 
 
